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Symposium:
The Greening of the World
Trade Organization?,
MR. REED: To open our program, let me welcome you.
My name is Patrick Reed, and I am the Chairman of the Committee On
International Trade at the Association Of The Bar Of The City of New York.
It is our pleasure to be a cosponsor of this symposium this evening on The
Greening Of The World Trade Organization. It is the third symposium that we
cosponsored with the Center for International Law at New York Law School,
and we are very pleased with this collaboration.
Our subject this evening is one of the most complex and difficult and
interesting aspects of trade policy: the way that the trade regime treats domes-
tic regulatory measures intended to protect animal and plants and human life
and health, as well as the environment. Our moderator and panelists will dis-
cuss the subject in more detail.
I would just like to thank our other cosponsors in addition to the Center
For International Law. Our cosponsors include the Committee On Interna-
tional Environmental Law here at the Association; The Environmental Law
Interest Group Of The American Society Of International Law, Chaired by
Laura Campbell; The Customs And International Trade Bar Association, rep-
resented by Sydney Weiss, President; and The Journal Of International and
Comparative Law at New York Law School.
I would also like to welcome my one distinguished guest, Judge Thomas
Aquilino of the Court Of International Trade.
With that, let me turn the floor to Professor Sydney Cone of New York
Law School.
PROFESSOR CONE*: Thank you. It's wonderful to be able to work
with the Committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. I
am very grateful with the organizations that have been mentioned for working
with us, including Mr. Ghett.
I am especially grateful to the people who are seated up here with me this
evening for coming here to talk to us about the asbestos case.2 We are quite
fortunate to have them here. I will not intrude on their time any more than
absolutely necessary.
1. The symposium was held in the Stimson Room at the House of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York on October 3, 2001.
* Sydney M. Cone, IN is the C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
International Law at New York Law School and Of Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton.
2. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
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They will speak in the order in which they're seated at the table, from my
left, your right; to my right, your left. The first speaker is Amelia Porges, who
is a former senior lawyer, both at the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative and the Secretariat of the GATr,3 predecessor to the World Trade
Organization.
Andreas - Andy Lowenfeld, who has probably taught quite a few peo-
ple in this room. He is a professor at New York University Law School. He
served on some of the panels that were set up under the GATT. He is cur-
rently fighting with a publisher over a voluminous text that he has prepared on
the law of world trade, and I, for one, look forward to the publication of that
text.
To my right is Steve Charnovitz, who was the Director of Environmental
Law Group at Yale University. He has participated in another symposium
right here in City Bar on trade and environmental issues. We're happy to have
him back. He's now at a law firm in Washington.
Robert Howse is a professor at the University of Michigan Law School.
He is very well known in the area of law of world trade. He is a prolific
author in the area.
All of that having been said, I would like to ask the speakers to speak in
the order in which I mentioned. We are going to keep this within a reasonable
time frame because it is very important, in the opinion of the people up here at
the table, to turn this into a discussion by and with you, the audience. We
particularly look forward to having your questions once the presentations have
been made. Please ask questions and please participate in the discussion once
the floor speakers have finished.
Amy.
MS. PORGES*: Thank you very much for inviting me, and I want to
thank everyone for coming. I'm really kind of surprised at such interest in
really a somewhat obscure topic, especially when everyone has really much
more important things to think about.
Let me just say that before I was in the private bar, when I was at USTR,
4
I litigated quite a number of cases, including some cases in this area of interna-
tional trade. And I would say, just for full disclosure, that I authored the U.S.
third-party submission in the asbestos case in the panel level. So basically,
like a lot of litigators, I tend to think that the things that I argued to the judge
were right even if the judge didn't agree, perhaps even especially if the judge
didn't agree.
3. General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade.
* Amelia Porges practices international trade and investment law at the law firm of Pow-
ell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, LLP, is a frequent speaker on dispute settlement, teaches
WTO law at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and was
principal author of the leading current work on GATT law, GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRAC-
TICE, published by the WTO.
4. Office of the United States Trade Representative.
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So I would like to just start things off tonight by talking a little bit about
asbestos and trade in asbestos. It's useful to know about it and to talk about
this case, the legal theories that were advanced by the parties, some of the
procedural aspects that were interesting, the outcome, the panel decisions, and
if there is time, to talk a little bit about the history of how the GATT and the
WTO dealt with the issue of international trade: a very fundamental principal
of nondiscrimination against imported products.
As for asbestos, asbestos is nasty stuff. Everybody agrees. Well, at least
everyone in the United States; not everyone in Canada. Asbestos is nasty
stuff. It has been known to be hazardous since the Romans, who noticed that
slaves in the asbestos mines tended to die quite fast. It has a crystal formation
in the form of long thin fibers that lodge in people's lungs and give them
asbestosis, which is scarring of the lung tissue. It has a latency period of 15 to
30 years. Mesothelioma, cancer of the lung membranes, is a cancer which is
not generally found in the absence of asbestos and which has the latency pe-
riod of 30 to 40 years and then is generally fatal in about 18 months, and lung
cancer, which has a latency period of 20 to 30 years. And particularly, asbes-
tos has a strong synergistic effect with smoking.
There are three kinds of asbestos: blue, brown, and white asbestos.
Chrysotile asbestos is the white asbestos. The major producer of the world
right now, at least the major producer in world trade, is Canada, and specifi-
cally Quebec, in asbestos. The asbestos mines and mills of Quebec are re-
sponsible for about 22,000 jobs and 6,500 indirect jobs. And asbestos has also
been a very big motive and topic in Quebec politics.
The strike in the asbestos mines in 1949 is when Pierre Treaudeau
emerged as a politician, and the start of modem French Canadian politics hap-
pen. And for this reason, in the 1980s when there was a growing move inter-
nationally to ban asbestos, the Canadians, the Quebec politicians in particular,
and others interested in asbestos pressured the Canadian government to do
something about those bans because exports are very important. Ninety six
percent of Canadian asbestos was exported in 1997, mostly to developing
countries. A lot of these exports are raw asbestos fibers packaged in paper
bags with warning labels if English, for all those people out there who read
English.
Well, as the last straw, I guess, for Quebec was the move in France to ban
asbestos. As the regulatory process moved forward in France, it became
clearly a greater and greater issue in Canada. You can actually see the traces
of this in parliamentary debates in Canada which are available on the Internet.
The Prime Minister Jean Chrdtien was the French Canadian. Politicians de-
manded that Prime Minister Chrftien raise the asbestos ban with the French
president, but it was impossible to stop the ban. The ban went into effect on
January 1 st, 1997, and eventually Canada brought a case in the World Trade
Organization against the ban.
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Now, I think it's quite possible that the Canadian government didn't re-
ally want to bring this case. It's quite possible, that is, that those involved in
trade policy may not have wanted anywhere near this case, but it was politi-
cally necessary. And this is actually one of the real life lessons of this case,
which is that a lot of cases are brought because of stakeholder interests that
have really very little chance of prevailing or defending, where there is very
little, very little chance of success.
So the case went forward. The case briefs were drafted in consultation,
as I was told. There was a grand consultation process. The Canadian govern-
ment tends to work very closely with stakeholders in this way: briefs drafted
in big meetings in Quebec City or Montreal considering what arguments to
raise.
Canada worked also very closely with the Brazilian asbestos industry.
Brazil also exports chrysotile asbestos.
The Canadian theories were as follows. The Canadian theories were
brought under two different agreements. One is the Agreement On Technical
Barriers To Trade. The Agreement On Technical Barriers To Trade is an
agreement originally negotiated on the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations
concluded in 1979, and then slightly reinforced during the Uruguay Round and
wrapped into the big package of the Uruguay Round Agreement. The WTO
Agreement structurally strengthened it, that is, which has as a centerpiece a
requirement that technical regulations, that is, regulations that lay down prod-
uct characteristics with which it is compulsory to perform, may not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade, and with a number of provisos attached.
So this was the central Canadian argument: that the asbestos ban was an
unnecessary obstacle to trade because so called "controlled use," that is, re-
quiring miners and millers and other people who use asbestos to wear respira-
tors, was just an effective way of preventing deaths caused by asbestos.
"Controlled use" policy was just as safe, and a ban was not necessary, and,
therefore, this was more trade restrictive than necessary.
Well, this was accompanied by claims that the asbestos ban was not
based on effective and appropriate existing international standards and that it
wasn't a performance standard; it was a design standard, and that it violated
the national treatment and most deprivation provisions in the Technical
Agreement.
The second line of attack was under the General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade. The argument was that the asbestos ban was a ban on imports of
asbestos under Article XI, a very silly argument. The panel basically dis-
missed it, and the Appellate Body ignored it, and deservedly so.
Then, I guess the court, in a most controversial argument, the argument
that the ban on asbestos was a de facto discrimination against an imported
product because the asbestos substitutes which were all produced in France




So there you have the basic face-off of violation claims at the panel level.
These were also accompanied by the Canadian argument that even if
there was no violation, if, even if the asbestos ban was legal, it had taken away
trade benefits that Canada had a reasonable reason to expect and that, there-
fore, Canada needed, deserved, to be compensated for the loss. For instance,
valuable market access bargained for many years ago for Canadian asbestos
exports.
So that led to the case in which there were three interested third parties.
At the governmental level the United States intervened, strongly opposing Ca-
nada and supporting the Community, 5 limited support for the Community.
Zimbabwe and Brazil supported Canada, since they both exported asbestos.
The Community's response was very interesting. The Community's re-
sponse was, of course, to deny that there was any discrimination against asbes-
tos. The Community's argument was that simply asbestos and the asbestos
substitutes, that is, both the fibers and the products containing asbestos, com-
pare to the substitute fibers like fiberglass and PVA and so forth. And the
products that contain those fibers, that those two groups of products are simply
not "like products." That when you're looking at a discrimination issue, you
have to compare two different "like products" and see if the imported "like
product" is being treated less favorably. Those are simply not "like." It is not
a question of treating "like" things differently; the things are not "like" to
begin with.
But more interestingly, the answer to the TBT agreement6 argument was
a denial that this agreement even applied. The argument was that all bans on
products were simply not technical regulations, that the ban here didn't really
lay down characteristics of products, it simply banned the products, and there-
fore, this agreement didn't apply at all.
So at the panel level, the panel then proceeded. The most interesting
thing that happened at the panel level was the consultation of scientific ex-
perts. The panel decided entirely sua sponte, not really at the request of either
of the parties, to consult four scientific experts. Why did they do this? I think
because they wanted to equip themselves to rule, to decide on these TBT is-
sues which, as you hear, are the basic difference of views between the Com-
munity and Canada. Certainly these Canadian arguments turn on, to some
extent, scientific issues.
The panel wanted to hear from the scientific experts on issues such as the
effectiveness of "controlled use," the relative pathogenicity of chrysotile as-
bestos and the other forms of asbestos, since, of course, a key Canadian argu-
ment is that somehow white asbestos is different, that it's less toxic than other
forms of asbestos.
5. European Community.
6. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
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Well, so the panel then picked the experts in consultation with interna-
tional organizations like WHO 7 and in consultation with the parties. They
picked three Australians from occupational health backgrounds and one guy
who was, in fact, an OSHA" regulatory expert from the U.S. Government.
What was the result? And then the panel, of course, then framed questions to
these people in consultation with the parties. The questions, the answers, and
the minutes of the hearing session that were held are all in the panel report.
You can see all their stuff if you want to read it.
The result was that the four experts completely collaborated the analysis
on which the French ban was based. They all agreed that all forms of asbestos
are carcinogens, that there is no threshold for exposure, that is, that lowest
exposure is harmless, that exposure causes many cancers, including cancers to
secondary users, that is, people who don't just work with asbestos occupation-
ally but encounter, let's say, an asbestos cement pipe in the process of fixing
plumbing, or who, for instance, buff asbestos tile floors like school custodians.
They agreed that "controlled use" is, in fact, impossible to practice and that the
substitutes exist, and they're all dangerous. So it was basically a slam dunk
against Canada from the standpoint of the experts.
The panel went on to rule that, on the other hand, they agreed, as a big
surprise I think, with the Community argument that the TBT agreement didn't
apply because product bans are not technical regulations. This was of great
concern to many people in the trade policy because this ruling opened up a
huge hole in the TBT agreement.
For instance, it would allow, as a random example, would have allowed
the community to rephrase the hormone ban as a measure that's based on
consumer preference, and at that point it would drop out of WTO regulation
altogether.
They agreed with Canada, however, that the asbestos and the substitutes,
and the asbestos-containing products and substitute "like products," and then
they found that the exceptions clause 9 again applied.
At the appellate level, the view of the expert evidence to find that the
danger involved in asbestos justified a ban, at the appellate level, after a curi-
ous episode, Canada appealed in October of 2000. And then the Community
cross-appealed, during the appellate process, as you may hear from Professor
Howse, who is in the amicus.
During the appellate process, the Appellate Body, for reasons best known
to itself, decided suddenly that it was going to invite amicus briefs. The con-
sulted parties had been announced, and a process of inviting applications for
leaves to file brief applications would be amici, to petition the Appellate Body
7. World Health Organization.
8. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
9. Paragraph (b) of Article XX of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,




for leave to file a later amicus brief. The petition would be three pages, saying
who you are, what your interest is, and what you're going to say is different
from what a government is going to say.
Well, after receiving 17 such applications, this announcement immedi-
ately triggered a huge flap in Geneva. The Egyptian Ambassador called for a
special meeting at the General Counsel1 ° about this. Before the due date for
the amicus briefs applications, this meeting happened and the Pakistan Ambas-
sador called for the Chair of the Appellate Body to resign. There was gener-
ally a consensus in the meeting against the Appellate Body, partially because
what the Appellate Body was doing strongly resembled a proposal that the
U.S. had made in dispute settlement procedures: to have an amicus procedure.
So in the end, the Appellate Body then rejected everyone's application
for the leave to file, gave rather unconvincing reasons, and left nobody happy:
not the Appellate Body, not the NGOs,1' and certainly not the developing
countries.
At the appellate level, you will hear more from parties about the decision.
The Appellate Body reversed the panel. It found that the TBT Agreement
does apply to this regulation. Of course, this regulation does apply to binding
characteristics, to identifiable products or groups, but they refused. They re-
fused to rule on any of the TBT claims that Canada had made because there
was not a sufficient record at the panel level. In other words, they punted.
There was a huge factual record, but the Appellate Body decided not to use it.
They then found that the products were not "like" after all. They redid the
analysis of "like" products. Again, you will hear more from people who have
more time to talk about it.
But they did the analysis of "like" products in a way which in many ways
goes back to the so-called "aim and effects" 12 doctrine of ten years ago. They
found that the panel had failed to take carcinogenicity into account in its find-
ings concerning "likeness."
But in the end, after trashing the panel's analysis of like products, the
Appellate Body, the majority, refused to complete the panel's analysis using
the facts and record and simply concluded that Canada hadn't met its burden
to provide evidence, and that, therefore, there was no violation of national
treatment. The Appellate Body then unnecessarily went on to look at the ex-
ceptions clause of the GATT Article XX(b). It had a long discussion of the
panel's finding and upheld the panel's finding that the decree was necessary
for health reasons. It found that "controlled use" wasn't a reasonable alterna-
tive to the product ban, and it upheld the way the panel had dealt with scien-
10. WTO General Counsel.
11. Non-governmental organizations.
12. Under the proposed "aim and effects" test, "likeness" under Article III of the 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would turn on whether the aim and trade effects of a
measure were protectionist of domestic products against imported products.
2002]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tific experts and their handling of the scientific experts. But again, these
findings under Article XX are in the end just dictum.
Let me stop there. I'll hold the discussion of non-violation for the ques-
tion period, in case someone is genuinely interested.
PROFESSOR CONE: Thank you.
Professor Lowenfeld has suggested that we go on to Steve Charnovitz
and that he, Professor Lowenfeld, will join in the discussion afterward so that
we can move more quickly in the discussion.
Let me just clarify one thing. Ms. Porges indicated, but rather quickly so
maybe it wasn't made clear, that the Appellate Body Division, three members
of the Appellate Body who ruled on this case when it was appealed from the
panel, was itself divided. This is quite unusual in WTO proceedings, so the
vote was in effect two to one. The division was over why were these products
not "like products;" why are asbestos and substitute products not "like prod-
ucts"? One member seemed to be saying they're not like products because
one is carcinogenic and the other isn't. The majority however, the two, were
saying in effect - and if the summary is inadequate, I'm sure I will be both
corrected and supplemented very soon - the two seem to be saying that as-
bestos and substitute product are not "competitive" within the meeting of Arti-
cle III, the National Treatment Provision in the GATT.
I am sorry to take up time.
MS. PORGES: Just to remark on the outcome. Here we are, Canada -
this is a great example of the great moral for lawyers that if you sue and lose,
you're generally worse off than if you would never have sued at all. Canada
has, by bringing this case - or Quebec, by pressuring the Canadian govern-
ment into bringing this case - those who pushed for this case have succeeded
in establishing a huge precedent against asbestos. They have succeeded in
further burying asbestos internationally and besmirching the reputation of as-
bestos. Now what they have succeeded in creating is a panel report which has
about 100 pages of expert testimony, endorsed by a respected international
organization that finds that this stuff is nasty, and that chrysotile asbestos is
just as bad as other forms of asbestos and equally deserving of the ban. This
was exactly the objective that Canada sought to prevent, and that's where it
winds up.
PROFESSOR CONE: Steve.
MR. CHARNOVITZ*: Thank you.
It's good to be back here. We had a program on the Shrimp/Turtle case13
here just precisely three years ago, and it is right after the Appellate Body
decision in this case. It's sort of interesting to think back on that evening
because the mood of the country was so much different then. We had a boom-
* Steve Charnovitz practices law at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C., and
has written widely on economic affairs, the environment, and human rights.
13. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (May 15, 1998).
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ing economy in late 1998. We were all feeling a lot more secure than perhaps
we do tonight. Our topic that evening was the security of the turtles. C-SPAN
covered the event that evening. So it is somewhat of a different world today.
PROFESSOR CONE: It was broadcast in prime time. It was following
an event featuring Hillary Clinton, just to show you how many years ago that
was. So it did get very good coverage.
Excuse me.
MR. CHARNOVITZ: Thank you.
Amy Porges, as she always does, gave a very good explanation of the
case, and so I will try to touch on some other areas that she didn't have time to
cover.
As she said, the panel had found that the French law was a violation of
GATT Article III but it was saved by GATT Article XX, the environmental
exception, and so France had won the case. The Appellate Body agreed that
France had won.
I think what makes this case so significant is that it's the first GATT or
WTO decision in which a challenged trade measure was held compliant -
trade measure regarding health was held compliant with GATT's environmen-
tal or health exceptions. So that makes it a very significant decision. It rein-
forced the favorable jurisprudence that started with the Shrimp/Turtle case,
and it's helping, I think, to build confidence of people around the world that
the WTO is now taking environment seriously. This case will also help build
public support in the United States for getting new trade authority through the
Congress. There is an effort in Washington right now to do that, and this
Appellate Body decision will help in that regard.
There is also another similarity with the Shrimp/Turtle decision. Both
that and asbestos are certainly high profile cases, and both also have very
troubling WTO panel decisions that were corrected by the Appellate Body.
In December we're going to lose three Appellate Body members that are
cycling off, and at the end of the year we'll have almost an entirely new Ap-
pellate Body than we had at the beginning of the WTO. Six out of seven will
be new and we don't really know in the future how the new Appellate Body
will operate.
But I will say the one that we had to start with has done the WTO a great
service in correcting some decisions which really would have hurt the WTO if
they had been allowed to stand.
I won't cover the TBT. I won't say that much again about Article III
either, in the interest of time. Rob Howse has been one of the champions of
this GATT Article III issue. He's written about it extensively and lectured on
it, and he may have time to deal with it. If not, perhaps we can deal with it in
the question period.
But the point to take away about the GATT Article III issue was that the
panel had said that the risky asbestos and the unrisky substitute could well be
"like products" no matter how much the risk was. The risk just wasn't in their
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mind. Risk wasn't a factor in the "like product" analysis, and that conclusion
troubled a lot of people, and the Appellate Body rightly overturned that.
Amy said this, yet it may have gone past people. She described the Ap-
pellate Body decision on Article XX as unnecessarily addressing Article XX
because the posture of the case was that at the panel level, France had been
found to violate Article III, but it was saved by Article XX. The Appellate
Body having reversed on Article III left no violation. So the Appellate Body,
could have stopped there and said, well, "we've done our work." Instead, they
reviewed Canada's concerns and appeal about the Article XX decision and
affirmed it.
I think that was significant. I'm not sure I quite call it dicta as Amy did,
but I think it was significant in that the Appellate Body, even though it didn't
have to, went ahead, ruled on Article XX, and made some very important
statements about Article XX. Maybe they were trying to move the trade envi-
ronment debate forward. I think they succeeded in doing it, and it was wel-
comed that they did.
A lot of people felt that when they reversed Article III they might stop
there and undo, in effect, the panel decision on Article XX, but they didn't.
They went ahead.
Let me just say a little about the Article XX issues. Canada appealed on
several points. One was that asbestos was not covered by Article XX(b) be-
cause it wasn't really a risk to human health. The Appellate Body upheld the
panel, stating that the panel enjoys a margin of discretion in assessing the
weight of the evidence in this proceeding. The panel called on four scientific
experts. The Appellate Body used a standard of review on whether the panel
exceeded the bounds of its discretion, and the Appellate Body said the panel
had not. Another point of appeal is whether the French measure was
"necessary."
You recall Article XX(b), the health exception, using the term "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health." Canada complained that the
panel had not quantified the risk of asbestos, which Canada claimed was low
or nonexistent and, therefore, could not properly come to the conclusion that
the import ban was "necessary."
The Appellate Body held that there was no requirement under Article
XX(b) for a quantification of risk, and it drew that conclusion, not so much
from Article XX but from SPS, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. It
drew that implication from the SPS Agreement, which was interesting.
Canada further appealed on the argument that a ban on asbestos was too
narrow in scope to deal with the risk. In other words, France was banning the
asbestos while permitting substitutes which could be risky, too. The Appellate
Body rejected this argument, saying that, and I quote here, "It was undisputed
that WTO members have a right to determine the level of protection of health
that they consider appropriate in a given situation."
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Now the Appellate Body didn't offer any citation from that sentence say-
ing it was undisputed. And as far as I can tell, this is a new pronouncement of
WTO law unsupported by any text in the GATT. There is some support for it
in the preamble of the Technical Barriers To Trade Agreement, but otherwise
that was a significant outcome of the Appellate Body decision.
Canada's last appeal was that the French measure was not "necessary"
because the alternative of "controlled use" was readily reasonably available.
The Appellate Body said that France could not reasonably be expected to
employ measures that would not achieve France's chosen level of protection,
which was to eliminate asbestos-related health risk. And noting that the panel
had found that the efficacy of the "controlled use" option had not been demon-
strated, the Appellate Body ruled that the "controlled use" was not a reasona-
bly available alternative.
The panel had also found the French measure had met subparagraph (b),
as qualified by the introductory clause to Article XX, the "chateau," as it's
sometime called. This binding was not appealed by Canada.
In my view, the panel's rationale on the chateau was a bit thin, even
recognizing that the EC would bear sort of the burden of defending itself on
that. So the conclusion of this Appellate Body decision on Article XX demon-
strates the proposition that the WTO can afford a great deal of deference to the
health choices that a government makes.
If you look at the panel decision you will see, in paragraph after para-
graph, all sorts of deference to national health scientific decision-making. On
the other hand, Canada stated serious claims on which relief could have been
granted by the WTO, and it wasn't. And Canada could very well feel that its
case wasn't really taken that seriously, perhaps because of the political over-
tones of this case.
Let me just say a couple of words about the amicus brief controversy. I
thought what the Appellate Body did was exactly the right thing to do. The
governments had been saying in the Dispute Settlement Body and around the
WTO for months that the Appellate Body's prior decisions in the Shrimp/
Turtle case and the Lead Bar case 14 on amicus briefs had left too much in the
air; that litigant governments would not know when a panel or the Appellate
Body might be accepting a NGO brief and, therefore, would not have an op-
portunity to respond to it quickly enough. So this was clearly being expressed
by the governments at the WTO that there was more needed in the way of
rules or procedure in terms of amicus briefs.
So the Appellate Body jumped into that and said that here we have an
asbestos case which is of great interest around the world. There are a lot of
NGOs that want to submit briefs. I think some had already submitted them.
14. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS 138/AB/R (Oct. 5, 2000).
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And the Appellate Body said we need the procedure; we've got to regularize;
they have to have transparency. So they quite properly put out a notice on the
web announcing to the world that everyone had eight days, not much time, but
eight days to get an application in for leave to file an amicus brief. That was
an appropriate thing to do.
Obviously, most of the governments didn't feel that way. As it turned
out, only the United States strongly defended the Appellate Body. There were
a couple of other governments that slightly defended them and called the spe-
cial meeting that Amy described which twisted the arm of the Appellate Body,
in effect, to back down.
So the Appellate Body denied all the applications, including one from
Rob Howse, and I imagine that Rob quite appropriately got his in on time.
And following in the tradition of distinguished law professors who try to sub-
mit amicus briefs to international courts, it was a shame that the governments
tried to interfere with the judicial independence of the Appellate Body.
Now from the governments' perspective this is a matter of WTO legisla-
tion, so if we're going to have procedures, it's up to us the government to
enact them, not the Appellate Body. But we had the WTO in operation since
1995. They haven't acted very much to provide for NGO participation. They
certainly haven't acted in the case of amicus briefs. They haven't acted by the
November 2000 meeting, where they jumped on the Appellate Body. And so,
given the government's inaction on this, the Appellate Body felt the need to
act.
Where are we now? Amicus briefs, I don't really know. The action of
the Appellate Body in rejecting these applications really calls into question
whether or not the panel's or the Appellate Body's procedure are going to
accept and read unsolicited briefs. That would be a shame if we lose that
significant positive development. Because accepting amicus briefs by the
WTO is beyond where other international courts are. The International Court
of Justice does not, at this point, accept amicus briefs. The WTO was ahead of
the curve on that. The WTO was significantly behind the curve with respect to
other issues relating to NGOs. The NGO participation in the WTO now is
basically nonexistent, whereas in the UN system, and as you have in New
York, there is quite a lot of NGO participation in the United Nations.
It would be unfortunate if this episode leads to no amicus briefs in the
future because the insularity of the WTO is one of its defects, and it's under-
mining popular support for trade and the WTO in this country and in other
countries, too.
If we're going to get public support for free trade, which is absolutely
essential, the public must have confidence in the WTO system, and that means
not only good decisions like the asbestos decision, and repeating that jurispru-
dence in the future, but also making the WTO more open and transparent than




PROFESSOR CONE: Thank you, Steve. I appreciate that very much.
As has been indicated, our next speaker is a one man NGO. He submit-
ted an amicus brief in his own name in this case. He and 16 NGOs, so 17
briefs. The Appellate Body formerly having solicited them, then ruled or then
stated that it had not accepted them. The Appellate Body did not say that it
hadn't read them.
At any rate, our one man NGO is our next speaker, Robert Howse.
PROFESSOR HOWSE*: Thank you very much, Professor Cone.
I will just pick up on that note. What I did do in the three pages, because
the Appellate Body didn't specify anything about font, was to basically make
the entire argument on the brief because I had an intuition, based upon an
encounter with a certain individual who happened to be seated near me in an
airplane, that the Appellate Body was not going the accept any of the briefs. I
took the chance of being considered out of order and actually said pretty well
everything I had to say in those three or four pages.
What put me out, though, was the letter that I received from the Appellate
Body staff that said that the brief had not been accepted because I had not been
in compliance with the precise requirements that were listed in the Appellate
Body's call for briefs or special procedure which included putting your name
and address, disclosing any material interest you had in the case, and a number
of other things. And I had done that scrupulously and also sent copies of it to
several leading practitioners and asked them whether I made any mistakes in
follow the requirements.
So I was pretty put out that I, as a professor of WTO law, who thought
that I could be quite careful in following a set of procedural requirements, had
for that reason been rejected, that I hadn't followed them.
I gave it as a test to my students, who are always looking for opportuni-
ties to show me up as someone who makes mistakes, and bless them, none of
the students managed to find anything in those three pages that did not con-
form to the requirements that the Appellate Body had set out.
Of course, the Appellate Body could merely have said it was exercising
its discretion not to accept an amicus brief, and that wouldn't have annoyed
me. It's a discretion, and no one has a right to have their brief accepted.
Well, it's good to be here and I really appreciate Professor Cone's hospi-
tality. Since I've arrived in town, he's treated me as if I were his personal
guest. Around one o'clock, when I was checking into the hotel and doing my
e-mail, when I got in the room there was a knock on the door, and usually
when people knock on the door of the room it's because they're drunk and
they think it's their room and it's not, or because somebody's got a room
service order screwed up, or because they're trying to turn down the bed or
give you chocolates. So my normal reaction is, I'm busy, go away.
* Robert L. Howse has taught at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and as a Visit-
ing Professor at Harvard Law School and has authored several books on international trade.
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Fortunately, on this occasion I was somewhat more surprised because it
was none other than Professor Cone who was thoughtful enough, since he was
passing through the area, to see if I could be his lunch guest. And that struck
me as a really lovely example of spontaneous grace, which is something that
people in the city have been showing in a big way recently.
So it's good to be here. I want to start by placing the asbestos decision in
a slightly different context, although one that I think is presupposed by some
of Steve's remarks, which is the context of the debate or struggle over global-
ization, between globalization and globalization's enemies, or to use a phrase,
globalization discontent.
One of the reasons that the WTO has been a target of what one might call
the discontent, or enemies of globalization, as well as people who just have
doubts about the course it's taken and who's driving it, has been the percep-
tion that the legal rules of the WTO somehow result in a limitation on the
ability of a democratic government to regulate in a manner that reflects legiti-
mate public values, the expression of legitimate public opinion in member
countries.
How did this perception come about? I think that we have to look back
for a moment to what I would refer to as the original GATT. The GATT was
a product of the post-war liberal international order. They tried to create an
institution for trade. Some of you may remember that project was the ITO, the
International Trade Organization, and failed. So what we got is the IMF, the
World Bank, and sort of the rump of the ITO, the GATT.
The GATT was essentially a framework for reciprocal negotiation of
trade concessions, the removal of tariffs or other comparable border measures.
But it was recognized that if you wanted to do trade through exchange of
concession or reciprocity - and, of course, economists would often tell you
that even unilateral liberalizing trade makes perfect sense - but if you want to
do it through reciprocity and bound legal commitments through a bargain or a
deal, you have to make sure that people don't cheat on the deal.
One form of cheating that was clearly already perceived to be possible
when the GATT was negotiated was that you can give tariff concessions to
your trading partners and then keep their products out by virtue of discriminat-
ing against those imported products in your domestic rules and regulations.
So one of the anti-cheating or anti-circumvention clauses in this GATT
legal frame work was the national treatment provision, which has two parts.
Article 111:2 deals with taxation and Article 111:4 with domestic laws, regula-
tions, and requirements. And what Article 111:4 says is that you have to pro-
vide no less favorable treatment for imported products than "like" domestic
products in respect to whole range of things: marketing, sale, and so on. So
it's basically an nondiscrimination norm. You can't discriminate against
imports.
The fact that the original GATT basically handled the problem that mem-
ber states might cheat on their trading concessions, their tariff concessions,
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and so on through discriminatory internal regulation, through basically a non-
discrimination type of requirement. Countries weren't required to give a justi-
fication for how they did their domestic regulation. There wasn't an attempt
to turn the GATT into the kind of global OMB,15 but instead, the line was
drawn at discrimination, protective discrimination.
So this was entirely consistent with what John Ruggy has referred to as
the basic structure of the post-war economic settlement, namely embedded
liberalism. And what embedded liberalism means was that the rules of the
global economic order were not imposed on domestic policies, but rather were
facilitative of domestic policies, domestic governments developing a progres-
sive social welfare regulatory state. You can reduce trade barriers, like tariffs,
quotas and so on, at the same time as building progressive, redistributive gov-
ernment regulation, and the two would go hand in hand.
Now, this idea of imbedded liberalism, treating the problem of domestic
regulation from a trade policy point of view through a nondiscrimination
norm, is entirely consistent with them. It's consistent with virtually complete
regulatory diversity, right? Because the principal is, we can regulate anything
and we can do it however we please, as long as the regulation is evenhanded
between imported and domestic products. As long as the regulation is not
protectionist, we can chose to regulate health and safety strictly or leniently, or
through command and control instruments, or through other policy instru-
ments. But if we're evenhanded and nondiscriminatory as between imports
and domestic products, we're okay.
And so you can have a wide variety of regimes, ideologically, in their
approach to regulation, and all of those regimes can fulfill their GATT obliga-
tions with respect to not implementing protective measures fully.
What happened to alter this? If this continued to be the case, then the
people protesting that GATT interferes with legitimate domestic regulatory
outcomes won't have much to say, and they would especially not have much
to say because with that view of Article 111:4 and Article XX, in the rare cases
where you might need to discriminate against imports, in those rare cases,
where you might need to discriminate against imports for legitimate regulatory
purposes, you have the Article XX exception.
For example, a country might want to ban outright imports for meat from
a country where mad cow disease is present. It might want to be explicitly
discriminatory on the basis of country because that happens to be the easiest
way of getting to a situation of low or zero risk, if you haven't had that risk or
disease yet on your soil. One of the easiest ways of dealing with it is to make
sure that you don't import any product from a place where that disease has
occurred. It's a crude surrogate, but easier to administer at the border than
inspection and so on.
15. United States Office of Management and Budget.
20021
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
So even in those rare cases where you felt the two events were legiti-
mately regulatory objectives and you had to discriminate, there was a limita-
tion clause. Then comes the '70s and '80s and the regulatory revolution,
where regulation comes under general criticism in a range of liberal democ-
racy and certainly by economists and many political economists, economic
conservatives, regulation is suspected to be more often than not driven by the
interest group captured, as opposed to serving the public interest.
And so, instead of a nondiscrimination norm, a view emerges that one
needs something stronger in the trading regime, because it's certainly true.
And those of you who studied discrimination law in other contexts, such as
equality in employment and whatever, will know there are many forms of
discrimination that don't appear on the face of the law. It's a genuine problem
to deal with, nonofficial discrimination. How do you distinguish between an
innocent disparate impact from a neutral rule on the one hand, and hidden
discrimination on the other?
But just at the time that that was being considered or increasingly viewed
as a problem in the GATI and eventually negotiated in the Uruguay Round,
negotiations with respect to TBT and SBS, it was an era of what Soros would
now call market fundamentalism, scepticism by regulation in general. So I
think that the zeitgeists, as it were, were such that it didn't seem unreasonable
that for purposes of trade liberalization, we should view the GATT norms with
respect to internal government regulation as somehow requiring or putting
some onus on a country that regulates to justify its regulations when they af-
fect trade.
That's kind of the opposite of the nondiscrimination approach which says
that if we don't find any protective discrimination, you can do whatever you
want. We're not going to haul you before the WTO and ask you if you did
cost-benefit analysis. That's a matter for domestic political debate and not for
international trade negotiations.
So we got the TBT agreement, which has been already briefly mentioned,
but what also developed was an interpretation of Article 111:4, the national
treatment provision that I've been talking about that was quite different than, I
think, the understanding that developed in the post-war era.
This was the view that what "like products" means is just to be defined
economically according to the marketplace and not taken into account whether
those products kill people, or whether they threaten endangered species, or do
other nefarious things that people might care about and might want govern-
ments to regulate against. If the products are substitutable in the marketplace,
we should view them as "like products," which means, therefore, that even if
there's no protective discrimination, a government should have to justify its
regulation under Article XX, under the exceptions provisions, which basically
tells governments, even if a neutral nondiscriminatory nonprotective regula-
tion has some impact on trade or some impact on one of your trading partners,
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we can haul you up before the WTO dispute settlement authorities and de-
mand that you make an account of your regulation.
Now, in an era, as I say, where many policy people and policy intellectu-
als and economists and so on were skeptical of regulation generally, this
doesn't seem all together unreasonable.
But circumstances and the zeitgeist change, and by the time that the Ap-
pellate Body had to deal with this case, I think it had changed somewhat, and
the pendulum swung somewhat back, with the results of the deregulation
revolution being very disappointing to many people, and indeed very threaten-
ing in terms of what they saw as the protection by governments of essential
human interests.
So what happened was that in early WTO cases, with respect to national
treatment Article 111:2, the taxation provision, came to be interpreted by panels
basically such that "like products" meant substitutable in the marketplace, or
"like" in terms of factors unrelated to basic human interests that governments
regulate about. And the impact would be that if you have regulatory objec-
tives that justify treating the products as "unlike," you have to deal with that
through the exceptions provision of Article XX.
The Appellate Body managed to sort of box itself in by affirming this
basic approach of panels in the Japanese alcohol case 16 to the problem of "like
products" in the taxation context. Having boxed itself in, the Appellate Body
now sort of found itself with a sort of very different kind of fact situation in
asbestos, where looking at whether the products are "like" or "unlike," from
the point of view of legitimate regulatory objectives, seems a lot more sensible
and a lot more related to what the case is actually about.
But instead of reverting to something like what Amy called the Aims and
Effects Test, the Appellate Body dealt with the problem through a much more
indirect route. And instead of getting out of the box through the front door, it
sort of tried to get out by the back door by suggesting that consumer prefer-
ences, which is in theory an economic idea, consumer preferences could be
used to understand why products that kill people are different from products
that don't kill people.
And they did that by looking at an idealized marketplace where consum-
ers of asbestos and "like products" would probably prefer the "like products,"
if you had a liability rule, but fully internalized the externalities, i.e., people
dying, getting very sick from the use of asbestos. But of course, that's not a
real marketplace. That's a marketplace where government or some kind of
collective authority has stepped in and decided in its wisdom to produce a
liability rule such that these externalities are internalized in an appropriate
way. And one might also say cryptically, at some level, if you buy the cough
16. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-1996-2,
WT/DS8, 10, 1 /AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
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serum, the choice of liability rules would reflect redistributive choices of that
society.
So through this device of an idealized marketplace and through the rubric
of understanding consumer preferences through this idealized marketplace, the
Appellate Body has managed to find its way back to what, I think, was the
original understanding of the role of Article III in the GATT. And given the
kind of criticism and concerns about globalization and with WTO's role in it,
that came none too soon. And on that point, I fully agree with Steve.
Am I out of time?
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes. On the other hand, you used your time bril-
liantly, and thank you.
Amy, do you want to say just a few brief words?
MS. PORGES: Goodness, I don't quite agree. I would have some differ-
ences of view with Article Ill, but it's sort of hard to get into it without - it's
really a two hour argument and not five minutes. There are people that have
better things to do.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: On the other hand, I'm free for a drink
afterward.
MS. PORGES: Just another remark to follow up on Steve, just about
amicus briefs. I don't think that amicus briefs are in a dead end at this point. I
think the amicus briefs are very much alive and well. The asbestos panel
accepted two amicus briefs from a place called the Collegium Ramasini, a
group of basically occupational health experts who hate asbestos, and from the
AFL-CIO. The AFL-CIO wrote a letter to the panel saying we don't like
asbestos; it's bad. And the panel accepted it.
In fact, amicus briefs may, in fact, be most useful at the panel level be-
cause it's there that the trier of fact, the panel, can receive more information
about the facts. Governments' knowledge of the facts is actually quite limited
often. And there are facts that don't show up. In a case, for instance, about
U.S. Home, what's is it called? The exception that allows mom and pop res-
taurants to play the home radio, exception to the copyright law, one of the
issues was whether this exception was reasonable, whether this unreasonably
impaired the rights of copyright holders. And in fact, the collecting societies
like BMI, I believe, wrote to that panel and said, we feel our interests are
impaired.
So let's say there's a future for amicus briefs. And, in fact, a very impor-
tant future for business stake holders, not just nonprofits, but business stake-
holders whose interests aren't being represented by either or any of the
governments in the case.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD*: Those of you who know me know
there's a limit as to how long I can remain silent. I think listening to Amy,
* Andreas F. Lowenfeld is the Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law at
NYU School of Law, is frequently an arbitrator in international disputes, and has written several
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particularly the asbestos case, is a dumb case. It should never have been
brought. And if you ask anybody, would you take this on contingency, no-
body would have taken it. Nobody would go around the world saying three
cheers for asbestos.
Why was this case taken? Well, there were political pressures. It had to
do with differences between Quebec and the national government, and we see
some of this in the United States and in other places, too.
My perception of the way that the DSU 17 was formed, the idea of moving
from relatively political to more judicial and legal disputes settlement, which
was a major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round, was to remove politics to
some extent from the disputes settlement. What turned out was that govern-
ments are not very good at screening out cases. They bring them when they're
pressed, and then they appeal cases where the appeal doesn't make any sense.
So now the case is that the appeal actually changed the law. But in many other
cases it doesn't. It just places a broader hold.
I would like to appeal to any of you in government or who are likely to be
in government sometime to take the position that the government does have a
screening function. Professor Dreyfus, my colleague, and I wrote an article a
couple of years ago looking at the TRIPS1 8 agreement and which kinds of
disputes ought to be brought, whether a patent holder who in patriae is
threatened somewhat can't bring the case directly, goes to it's government, say
the United States or the EU. 19 And they ought to say, wait a minute, this isn't
the right case to bring, and that's our decision to make. And I miss that func-
tion in the trade offices. End of speech.
PROFESSOR CONE: Let's have some questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Kind of directed at everybody because I'm a
little bit confused, I think maybe because there were some differences of opin-
ion among the panel.
PROFESSOR CONE: There is.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Certainly it was a bad case to bring, but
Steve, you said this was a victory for the environmental community and sort of
likened it to Shrimp/Turtle. I'm not sure I saw the analogy there.
But it seems there are two major issues. One was whether "like product"
could be distinguished based on health effects of the product under Article III,
as opposed to having to go to the exception. And Professor Howse, you talked
about this more. I'm not sure I fully understood, but I think your discussion
was extremely interesting and basically, as I understand, on both levels said,
no, but the appellate level found another way to say that these were not "like
products."
books covering aviation law, public international law, international economic law, conflict of
laws, and civil procedure.
17. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
18. WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
19. European Union.
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From the environmental perspective, that was not great because health
differences and health effects of the products are not going to be allowed, even
now, to be used as a basis of distinguishing products, if I understand this cor-
rectly. The Appellate Body did not say that they were "unlike products" on
that basis, is that correct?
PROFESSOR HOWSE: That was what I think concerned the member
who wrote the concurring opinion, that he felt that the plurality/majority opin-
ion did not state explicitly enough that in this situation, the fact that the physi-
cal differences between the products had significantly different health effects
and, therefore, would be viewed differently from the consumers. It was a clear
basis for regarding the products as "unlike."
But I think that Steve was basically right. You can make an analogous
argument in a wide range of situations. I mean, you could argue the Shrimp/
Turtle case, which the United States didn't cross the national treatment issue
and conceded that it was a violation - or it didn't concede, said it would not
contest that it was a violation of Article XI.
You can make a similar argument. Consumers, if they do care, some
group of consumers do care as to whether the shrimp is turtle-friendly or not.
And given those consumer preferences, in an idealized marketplace, if you
internalize the global environmental externalities, the risk to the turtle mortal-
ity, that you would have fully internalized that by the appropriate rule, you
would have a situation where you would have a market price differential.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Let me just come back to a kind of more
simple environmental perspective on this. One is the products were not distin-
guished based on environmental effects. I think that was the point you made,
right? So you still have to look to an exception. And luckily, they said it was
okay under the exception. But your whole issue about whether a legitimate
regulatory objective, such as the environment, would be a basis for distin-
guishing the products was not accepted by either the panel or...
PROFESSOR CONE: I think, if I may presume to interpret Professor
Howse, I think he's saying in a sort of subtle way, two members of the Appel-
late Body who did not agree with the concurring opinion were creating an
idealized argument in order to come out with the result that you would find
good.
I myself would say, and I will just add one sentence and I will step back.
I myself would say that I think that Professor Howse, who is quite brilliant in
all of this, is doing more than postulate an idealized marketplace. I think he's
postulating an idealized decision about the two members of the Appellate
Division.
MR. CHARNOVITZ: Let me just add one brief point. I don't really
understand the concurring opinion that well because I don't see that there is a
category in the GATT or in GATT Article 111:4 for "unlike products." There's
simply a "like product" category. So I don't know how a panel or the Appel-
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late Body could define these things as "unlike products" because that category
does not exist.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: But you say they're not "like products."
MR. CHARNOVITZ: Yes, it had not been proven they were "like
products."
PROFESSOR CONE: Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: First, I'd like to state my bias. I'm a former
chair of the International Environmental Law Committee. I want to welcome
and thank the panel for being here on behalf of that committee. And also I'm
a professor of environmental law and international environmental law.
I would like the panel to perhaps get back to the title of the panel, The
Greening Of The World Trade Organization. It seems to me, from what you
said, that the asbestos case isn't necessarily an environmental case. It actually
couldn't have been brought solely under Article XX(b) because the chateau
article has the discriminatory requirement in it which could have covered the
Article III issue, and it could have been a straight Article XX case.
But isn't the Shrimp/Turtle case a far more important case in terms of
GATT's ability to deal with environmental issues, to the extent that in asbestos
you were dealing with the product itself, whereas in Shrimp/Turtle you were
dealing with the way the product was cooked? There was nothing the matter
with the shrimp; they weren't dangerous. And I think the environmental com-
munity is most concerned with the question of dealing with the way products
are made as well as the products themselves. And perhaps Shrimp/Turtle
opens the door a crack on that issue as to how GATT can deal with environ-
mental issues. I'm not sure asbestos helps us very much on that concern.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: I guess I'm called on because the relation
between Article III and Article XX was so out at length in this case, which
was one of the panels. Of course, at that time there was no Appellate Body.
But generally, that's regarded as a leading case under the subject, and the
decision in that case was that the complainant has to show that its rights are
violated by, for example, saying it's Article III rights have not been honored.
And then only after the United States took the opposite position, but lost on
that issue. And then Article XX is an affirmative defense with the burden on
the regulator. I don't see how you can bring a case under Article XX until you
have an initial cause of action under Article III or Article XI or one or the
other articles.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: Shrimp/Turtle was...
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: It was XI, not III. But what I'm saying is
Article XX is an exception to the general rule. It's an affirmative defense, and
the burden of proof is on the importing, responding country.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: I would like to get back to the question on the
distinction between the process and the product because it seems to me that I
understand, first of all, the environmental community may be particularly con-
cerned with legitimating in some way considerations of process. On the other
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hand, there also seems to me that starting from the post-war settlement, as
Professor Howse described it, that the consent, that essentially the focus has to
be if that's your starting point on the product rather than the - let me just
explain what I sort of think and maybe you can tell me in detail why I'm
wrong.
I think that when you start going into the process at that point, if you
agree in the original consensus, let's say not in the 1970s critique and not the
subsequent, the post deregulation phase, that you're not going to be looking at
so much the domestic arrangements of national states as much as the focus
will be on the effects of the products when they are in your "territory". In
other words, when they become imports. Then I think that's what makes it
difficult to get to the process of production, assuming that the process of pro-
duction falls within domestic jurisdiction.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: There is no such conception of jurisdiction in
the GATT. If I want to regulate an order to prevent Turtle/Shrimp being killed
outside of my jurisdiction, that's just as much a legitimate part of regulatory
diversity as regulating to prevent them from being killed within my jurisdic-
tion. No such distinction is known to the GATT treaty text.
And this, if you're interested, my colleague, Don Regan, and I have writ-
ten a 40-page article in the EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW that
explains why the product-process distinction is totally bogus. It has no basis
in economics and no basis in the text of the GAT. It was invented oppor-
tunistically in a result-oriented way by two unadopted panels at the end of the
'80s, beginning of the 1990s, because it was a way of keeping the environmen-
talists who were regarded as barbarians at the gate out of the GATT. The
wording of Article 111:4 does not refer to internal laws, regulations, or require-
ments effecting products or on products. Contrary to what the panel suggested
and contrary to what people like John Jackson have sometimes suggested, the
language in Article 111:4 is different. It refers to internal laws, regulations, and
requirements effecting various aspects, like market and distribution and so on,
of the product in question.
And so, the idea that Article 111:4 only deals with measures that regulate
elements of the product itself is completely textually unfounded.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: I'm sure that you're right in terms of textual
analysis and legal analysis, but the subsequent question is, can we change the
politics sufficiently that we can now more generally go beyond Shrimp/Turtle,
and going forward from Shrimp/Turtle, if you like to really integrate the pro-
cess considerations?
I'm particularly interested, for example, in labor issues.
MS. PORGES: I was about to raise labor issues because, just to flash
backwards to the infamous dolphin report, I was around Geneva at the time,
and it was tremendously popular. And the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection
Act was tremendously unpopular because of its extra-jurisdictional aspect of
telling Mexico and other countries how to fish.
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You have no idea how unpopular it was, and one of the reasons why it
was so unpopular was precisely the link to labor. Because the logic used in
defending against tuna fishing the wrong way, in the U.S., the basic perception
of the developing countries then and now is that if the U.S. can stop tuna that's
been fished the wrong way from entering its borders, it can also stop imports
of sweaters from Bangladesh unless the people who knit those sweaters were
paid the U.S. minimum wage. And if you allow that, then you don't have
anymore comparative advantage. You basically have erased the reason for
trading. That's generally the feeling we hear from developing countries in
Geneva. I guess it goes back to your post-war settlement.
PROFESSOR CONE: I want to get on to other questions.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: I don't think the post-war settlement was pre-
mised upon the assumption the countries would be abandoning the possibility
of using trade action to protect workers or protect the environment, but I think
Steve Charnovitz has actually done some historical work on this issue, and I
defer to him on that.
I think the sort of wage homogenization hypothetical is a complete ca-
nard. Under standard Article 111:4 analysis, if you look at the beer case where
there was a minimum price requirement that seemed to be neutral between
certain imported beer and Canadian beer, a panel was able to find, neverthe-
less, that there was discrimination because the minimum price happened to be
set based upon the cost of purely domestic producers.
You don't need a product-process distinction in order to be able to fare
out that kind of discrimination. The labor concern is a human rights concern.
There's nothing in the post-war settlement that suggests that you couldn't have
sanctions as part of the tool kit with which to deal with gross violations of
human rights, including labor rights.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Just a point of fact on that. I'm from Social
Accountability International. We work on the standards in the labor rights
area. I am not aware of any case where any of these proposed standards or
codes require someone in any country to pay another country's minimum
wage. And it is possible that exporters in Bangladesh peered that, but it was
an incorrect perception.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: It's not just wages.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: That wages should obey domestic rules, just
saying that they should meet a living wage. A living wage is, under no inter-
pretation, the wage that we pay in the United States.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: It's not domestic minimum wage, but it's
such issues as, for example, child labor.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Yes, of course.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: And of course, the GATT does permit
prohibition of slave and prison labor. But then you say, what about the 15
year old girl? It's not quite like the minimum wage. It's again part of the
issue that Amy talked about.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: There's a wide range of provisions.
MS. PORGES: Let me just add one thing, which is, right now, that sanc-
tions were really a big thing in the year when we were the almighty United
States and lead the world with the mightiest economy and the eight boom
years.
Now we're heading into a rather different era. We're actually heading
into an era which you see the U.S. Government looking more for cooperation
from other governments, and it will be very interesting to see what happens to
the overall political situation for basically threatening other governments until
they change their domestic policy.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: There are many ways to address that.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: I think the cooperation and threats - I mean, if
you know the social science literature, cooperation and threats in real life are
not simply opposite kinds of strategies. They can be quite consistent
strategies.
Sometimes, the reason people cooperate is what they think will happen to
them if they don't cooperate. I mean, almost all negotiations are based upon
threats of some kind, that is to say, predictions of what the one party will be
able to do to the other in the absence of a negotiated outcome. So I don't think
these things can be understood as two opposed strategies.
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, ma'am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: My question is, is this really the reading of
WTO given that the Appellate Body on first impression on Article XXIII held
that Article XXIII applies to provisions, and Article XXIII referring to
whether there are benefits that a country receives through the marshal, in this
case the Marrakesh Treaty of Canada, whether those benefits were nullified or
impaired due to France's decree?
MS. PORGES: Non-violation, it's really one of the most staggering, I
will say, it's one of the more obscure comers of the GATT. There have been
five or maybe six successful cases under the GATT in over 50 years. It's very
rare. And the last case was brought by the United States against Japan and
was unsuccessful, the famous Kodak case. It's very difficult to prevail in a
case like that. There is a very high legal burden required to show exactly what
kind of commercial benefits one was deprived of, and Canada simply didn't
meet the burden. They didn't. I think the Appellate Body successfully ducked
the issue of whether Canada really had a right to expect the benefits, whether
they were in fact - whether the benefits were frustrated or not. I think the
Appellate Body decision does leave certain things open, and that the possibil-
ity that a government will be sued essentially for a manner to provide compen-
sation for regulatory actions, even if those regulatory actions are totally legal,
is very remote.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: I agree with that. The Europeans had very odd
lawyers. The lawyering for Europe was very odd for this case, and I don't
think it was outstanding by any means.
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They asked the Appellate Body to find that the non-violation remedy
didn't apply to health-related disputes. You don't ask a court to make a ruling
that far broader than the facts of the case you're litigating. All the Appellate
Body said was, since there isn't the evidence here, the factual evidence neces-
sary to even make the claim.
I mean, we can't say it doesn't apply to health-related issues because that
would be creating law; it would be creating a general kind of bright line rule
that's not in the treaty itself. But as Amy says, you're not going to, in prac-
tice, get a case where a country is going to be able to jump through all the non-
violation hoops that you have in Kodak/Fugi and manage to convince the tri-
bunal that there's liability because you expected that they would have changed
their law to save their citizens' lives.
MS. PORGES: The essence of the non-violation claim is that the defend-
ing party is totally entitled to maintain their measure. They just have to com-
pensate. They don't compensate the stakeholders; they don't actually pay
money. What they do is, maybe they provide tariff compensation for some
other exporting industry from the injured country. This is really not the kind
of remedy that stakeholders like. What they really want is for the measure to
vanish. The likelihood that you get such a claim is very, very small.
MR. CHARNOVITZ: In response to that question and an earlier ques-
tion. I think the title the sponsors gave for this is appropriate, The Greening
Of The WTO. Health and environment these days are really intertwined as
WTO issues ,and it would be hard really to say this is not an environment case.
It's a precedence, a green case; it's health care. I think there has been green-
ing in this case and along with Shrimp/Turtle, it demonstrates that.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: I think the NAFTA and the methane case
where that is a poison, and that's permitted as long as California pays Canada.
But that's against the interests of the citizenry in general. Why should the
stakeholder have rights, superior rights, to the citizens when it comes to our
health?
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: It's really an investment case and not a
trade case.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: Can I say one thing? Because of this trend
toward compensation in the case of regulatory expropriation and international
trade involvement, it is in the investment chapter of NAFTA and every invest-
ment treaty. Investment trade themselves are becoming, moreover, lapse. I
thought this whole line of discussion, even through the nullification, hasn't
been used effectively yet with WTO, is a really interesting issue to be raised.
That has to do with the question of people being opposed to the former
globalization going on. It's not in the interest of the citizens.
PROFESSOR CONE: Any other questions? Let's go to the back of the
room.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: A question on public perception of the read-
ing of WTO. Steve Charnovitz, the Shrimp/Turtle, three years ago, about how
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much amount of publicity for the Shrimp/Turtle decision that has been made
seemed to fall into a publicity black hole. One really, really had to look for it
to find out that it existed at all. Thoughts, comments.
PROFESSOR CONE: There is somebody in the room who had more to
do with that than the WTO. The U.S. Court of International Trade, and in the
end, the United States or the environmentalists in the United States really
prevailed.
You're absolutely right you have to follow that case very closely in order
to know what happened in the end. As I say, in the end the U.S. environmen-
talists really prevailed. I was in the courtroom, the judge that's here who was
presiding over a key hearing on that case, and I was the only person in the
courtroom other than the judge and his staff and counsel. Nobody from the
public was there. And that's a very good point, that these cases, what ulti-
mately happens, you really have to want to know what ultimately happens.
The press loses interest in it.
Sorry to make a speech. I should let other people yell and speak. Some-
body else.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: Steve Charnovitz seems to indicate or imply
that what happened in Seattle had some impact upon, at least, the WTO's
desire to be seen in a better light, in light of the fact of the Appellate Body and
its decision. Do you think that it might have? It could have?
MR. CHARNOVITZ: Yes. I think the dismal failure of the WTO in
Seattle to launch a new round has had a lot of effect. It hasn't lead to a sort of
reform people hoped they would and a lot of developing countries hoped they
would. It did shake people up, I think, in a positive way on issues like envi-
ronment and health and so-called sovereignty issues and public access to the
WTO. And we'll see what happens at Doha, if it occurs.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: It's still true that the world likes the
WTO, because it does have fairly effective dispute settlements. If, for exam-
ple, you had an international environmental organization, it would either have
to start with nothing or there would be no remedies readily available.
So I think your right, Steve. You want to try to green the organization a
little bit, and the organization wants to be the organization which has effective
dispute settlement and remedy.
You and I have talked about that before. We had a debate in Minnesota
about sanctions and whether sanctions in the context of the WTO made sense.
Of course, everybody knows the right thing to do is withdraw the objectiona-
ble measure and not have a counter measure, because that has the restrictions.
But the fact that there is an effective way to resolve disputes of various kinds,
including these disputes, is what I think the world wants.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: I would like to get the theme raised about the
latest Shrimp/Turtle panel decision and really to put it particularly to Rob
Howse, Others may want to comment about it, about how I think he has
painted his analysis of the asbestos Appellate Body decision in rather clean
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lines of a very broad policy in which the stakes would have regulatory free-
dom, provided they don't discriminate. I wasn't clear about it's a correlation.
But my question is, really, where that clean lines analysis of the asbestos
decision is, in fact, really catches what's been going on. For example, the
Shrimp/Turtle panel, where I think one might say the whole thing has disap-
peared into a very murky world of process, where the United States should
negotiate in good faith with this or that country, and things go back and forth.
In the event there may be a major act on the United States that is fair. It's
really - I think you can read that WTO system runs out at some point. It's
not clean lines at all; its gradually fading into obscurity. So that's a hypothe-
sis. What is your approach and what actually is going on are really very much
in attention.
PROFESSOR HOWSE: I think that what the Appellate Body has recov-
ered is something of the spirit of embedded liberalism, but through an ap-
proach that I think you have well described. I think that, probably, I misspoke
if I gave the impression that what the Appellate Body was returning to or tried
to return to is a clean line distinction between illegitimate discriminatory mea-
sures and legitimate ones that were nondiscriminatory. I think it's returning a
bit to the zeitgeist that underlay that jurisprudential approach, but it's doing it
through a somewhat different route.
I like the image that you used. And in writing about this, I've used the
terminology of subsidiarity, that it's putting one layer of subsidiarity onto an-
other, so that we scrutinize the process more carefully than substance, in the
sense of not second guessing the substance outcomes so much. And then, if
you don't get enough deference through being sensitive in the way you define
"like products," there's an additional layer of deference available in the Article
XX stage.
So, as you say, it's more a kind of fading out, or multiple hedges and
dams, against inappropriate intrusiveness. That's because while we could re-
cover something of the zeitgeist that produced it, I don't think we can ever
recover a naivete around the idea of having a clear line about discrimination.
That's why I did say that it's a genuinely messy problem. Once you start
thinking through the problem of what is and isn't discrimination, you have a
certain consciousness about it being a messy line that makes it hard to go back.
So I think that they have gone forward, and whether the fading out metaphor
or the multiple dams of defenses or whatever metaphor, I think we're grasping
for the same thing, that they're doing it through a more complex and nuanced
and multistage kind of route.
PROFESSOR CONE: Two more comments and then with thanks and
gratitude, we'll adjourn.
MR. CHARNOVITZ: In response to Ben's question and an earlier ques-
tion, might I make a couple of very brief points about this Article XXI:5 deci-
sion in the Shrimp/Turtle case? One is it's under appeal, and we should hear
shortly what the outcome is. Second, there is a really interesting interplay
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between the WTO rules and U.S. Courts, and I call your attention to that.
Third, this case really is about Article XX; it's not about Article I. And
fourth, that the panel, each Article XXI:5 compliance panel suggested, I think,
that there would be continuing supervision of the United States under this, that
as of right now we had complied. But that Malaysia was free to bring it up in
the future if the U.S. wasn't making enough progress or whatever, and there-
fore, that it could come back to the WTO, and that's a role of a compliance
panel in supervising.
PROFESSOR LOWENFELD: I just want to say a word that came up at
the beginning and not again. I like the idea that panels get scientific experts,
and we saw it solved in the way of the hormones case because the scientists
couldn't show that there was a real hazard. We don't really quite understand
the precautionary principal. If the panel's thinking, we're going to get clean
scientists. And we wouldn't worry about their - we'll ask about conflicts of
interests, but we'll try to satisfy ourselves that they're scientific professionals.
Seems to me that's a very good way to resolve the kind of issues that come up
on whether it's under the TBT or SBS, and I hope that is a lesson that will
continue in this case.
MS. PORGES: And it will also help the WTO get greener, at least coex-
ist better with organizations, unlike earlier scientific groups which help panels
rule that, other than measures taken ostensibly, environmental reasons were
really a trade redraped or were going overboard. This one agreed; they all
agreed that this was a legitimate environmental health and safety measure.
PROFESSOR CONE: I want to thank the members of the panel here, not
the asbestos panel, but this panel. Thank you very, very much for your time
and above all, for the quality of your contribution.
I want to thank everybody in the room for coming and for participating in
it. I think we can stand adjourned.
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